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# OBSERVATIONS ON THE REMARKS OF THE

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# REMARKS

On a late

## *Political Farce, &c.*



O sooner was a peace concluded between the late contending powers in *Europe*, but the eyes of the whole nation were immediately turn'd towards a *set* of men, which we have amongst us ; who, with great *modesty*; and a becoming *merit*, stile themselves —  
**THE PATRIOTS.** Every man's curiosity was excited to behold the *part*, which they should think fit to act upon this occasion.

Several meetings and consultations were held by these men — what was to be done, upon this unexpected turn of affairs; “ the first news of which “ (as we are told) gave them a very *great alarm* ;” as indeed it well might. Their business therefore was, either to render this glorious work, which his Majesty's wise councils and mediation had brought to pass, *abortive* — or to *ridicule* the conduct of his Majesty and his ministers, and to ascribe the whole to *chance*.



The first of these, the preventing a *general peace*, being found to be impracticable; the other was resoly'd on. And the result of all their councils was — “ That the *patriot*, who has so remarkably  
 “ distinguish'd himself for his *acute* reasoning, in  
 “ several political productions, with which he has  
 “ obllg'd the publick — that this man should,  
 “ with all convenient speed, publish a letter to the  
 “ people of *Great Britain*; in which, with great  
 “ gravity, and laying aside his usual *scurrility* and  
 “ *personal invective* — he was to congratulate his  
 “ countrymen, on this *fortuitous* event of things —  
 “ to assure them, how sincerely the whole body of  
 “ *patriots* rejoyc'd in the present prospect of peace,  
 “ tho' they had been most virulently and unwor-  
 “ thily reproach'd with opposing every measure,  
 “ that could contribute to it — earnestly to in-  
 “ treat them to believe, that the *ministers* had no  
 “ *share* or *merit* in the transacting this *peace* —  
 “ that they had acquir'd no credit or thanks, by  
 “ their negotiations in any foreign court — that  
 “ it was ridiculous to hear them ascribe the least  
 “ share of merit to themselves — and that they  
 “ might as well boast of a plentiful harvest, a heal-  
 “ thy season, or any other immediate gift of hea-  
 “ ven.

This was the result of their mature and wise coun-  
 cils, as will more fully appear in the sequel of this  
 discourse. And accordingly the person, who was  
 made choice of to act this *solemn farce*, sets himself  
 to work, and we have now his letter to the good  
 people of *England*, under this title — *Some Obser-*  
*uations on the present Plan of Peace.*

Our author, being thus furnish'd with his *instruc-*  
*tions*, sets out with making this notable remark —  
 “ That no-body, who hath the interest of his coun-  
 “ try, or the welfare of mankind, truly at heart,  
 “ can



“ can have so much spleen or resentment against any  
 “ particular minister, as to repine at it, upon his  
 “ account.” *Observations*, p. 4.

As if he had said — “ No man, who hath the  
 “ interest of his country, or the welfare of mankind,  
 “ truly at heart, can repine at the interest of his  
 “ country, or the welfare of mankind.

Very judicious indeed ! and tends greatly to *prove*,  
 which is what this writer is so solicitous to have the  
 people *believe* — “ That there are not any men  
 “ amongst us, who have so much spleen or resent-  
 “ ment against a *particular minister*, as to repine  
 “ at the interest of their country, or the welfare of  
 “ mankind.

Ay, but says our author farther — “ I am con-  
 “ fident, that even the gentlemen, who have been  
 “ the most virulently reproach’d with such unwor-  
 “ thy motives to their opposition of some late mea-  
 “ sures, rejoice in the present prospect of peace ;  
 “ as much as those, who may be more nearly con-  
 “ cern’d in the completion of it.” *Ibid.* p. 4.

This indeed looks like saying something to per-  
 suade the world, that we have no *such* men amongst  
 us. But even here, how tenderly does the *ass*  
 mumble the *ibistle* ? “ The gentlemen in the oppo-  
 “ sition have been reproach’d with such unwor-  
 “ thy motives to their opposition of some late  
 “ measures.

Had he told the world — what *those* late mea-  
 sures were, which these gentlemen oppos’d, it would  
 plainly have appear’d to every impartial man — whe-  
 ther they were justly reproach’d with such unworthy  
 motives to their opposition, or not.

But he was conscious to himself — That it was  
 much safer, and more for their credit, to conceal  
 the conduct of these gentlemen, and what those  
 measures were, which they oppos’d.

Now

Now it is notorious to all the world — That *without doors*, the writers in the *Craftsman*, who speak the sense of the *faction*, have, ever since the war broke out, exercised all their low wit and drolery to revile and ridicule the councils and the ministers of his Majesty : and, at the same time, oppos'd every measure, that was resolv'd on to prevent the war becoming general, and to put an end to it.

And, when they were called upon to propose any *other* measures, more likely to attain these happy ends — Nay, when they were reproach'd, and it was undeniably prov'd, that they would not want arguments or pretences to oppose *any* measures whatsoever, that should be propos'd by his Majesty and his council to put a stop to the war — What was the conduct of these gentlemen? Did they propose any *other* measures? Did they give one reason to persuade or satisfy the world, that they oppos'd this or that particular measure, as they verily believed it to be wrong? — Or that they were not determin'd to oppose every measure, right or wrong?

Nothing like it. They peremptorily refused to give satisfaction, or to declare themselves upon any one of these points. If this then has been their conduct, how can they have the confidence to complain of having “ been virulently reproach'd with “ such unworthy Motives to their opposition as “ spleen or resentment against any *particular minister* ? ” Or how can they have the assurance to tell the world, “ That they *rejoice* in the present “ prospect of peace ? ”

It is highly ridiculous and absurd in this writer (as shall be fully prov'd in the following papers) to pretend to say — “ That it is astonishing, that any “ person should think it for the credit of our mi-  
nisters

“ nisters to give them the whole merit of this trans-  
 “ action.” But it is truly astonishing, that this  
 writer should think it for the credit of him and his  
*faction* to boast of their “rejoicing in the present pro-  
 “ spect of peace.” For he will be very hard put to  
 it to give one satisfactory reason, why they ought to  
 be believed. To say, — “ That every person must  
 “ rejoice at the present prospect of peace, who has the  
 “ interest of his country at heart ” — is a ridiculous  
 begging of the question, because it is denied, “ That  
 “ they have the interest of their country at heart.

This harmless well-meaning gentleman goes on  
 to tell us — “ That he does not publish his *Observa-*  
 “ *tions on the present Plan of Peace*, with any de-  
 “ sign of inflaming our differences, or casting the  
 “ least damp over the publick joy, but only to take  
 “ off false colours, and set things in a true light, as  
 “ the proper way to pursue right measures for the  
 “ future.

What shuffling, and disguise, and contradiction is  
 here again? have not the writers in the *Craftsman*,  
 from the very day this war broke out, been la-  
 bouring to possess the people, not only — “ That  
 “ the measures, which were taken, could not  
 “ possibly have any effect to prevent the war be-  
 “ coming general ” — But, “ that these very  
 “ measures would most certainly be the occasion of  
 “ the war becoming general.”

Now, whether the measures, that were pursu'd,  
 did actually prevent the war becoming general or  
 not — this writer, and his coadjutors, have  
 prov'd themselves false prophets, in saying — “ that  
 “ the measures, which were taken, could have no  
 “ other effect, than to make the war become ge-  
 “ neral.”

And if the pretending to foretell this, which  
 has happen'd just contrary to what they foretold,

was



was one of those arts, whereby they endeavour'd to inflame our differences; and to stir up the people against the ministry—must they not conclude, that when the people see, what *lying, false, malicious* prophets these men have been, this must greatly tend to reconcile them to the ministry, and to allay our differences?

It is no wonder then, as ridiculous, and absurd, and false as it is, to see these men fly to, and take sanctuary in the only poor shift and pretence, which they have left to keep up and inflame our differences, and to prevent, if possible, the people being universally reconcil'd to the ministry, by endeavouring to persuade the people——“ That the “ ministry had no share or merit in this transaction “ of putting an end to the war.”

Tho', supposing they were able to prove this, it is very far from justifying their conduct, or being any good reason to inflame any man against the ministry; since these writers stand convicted in the *principal* accusation brought against the ministry——“ That the measures, which were taken, “ must certainly involve all *Europe* in a war.”

But I am far from supposing—that this writer has said one word to prove, “ that the ministry “ had no share or merit in this transaction.” On the contrary——if the measures pursu'd were such, as carried their *own* conviction, and declar'd to all the world, that we were resolv'd not to be *too* long idle spectators of the war; it is a strong presumption, if not a plain proof to every impartial man, that those vigorous measures not a little contributed to give a check to the arms of *France*.

But, for God's sake, what one good purpose can it serve to endeavour to persuade the world——“ That “ our ministers had no share or merit in this “ transaction?” or is it possible for any writer to attempt this, with any other view, but “ to in-  
“ flame

“ flame our differences, to cast a damp over the  
 “ publick joy,” from these base motives, “ of  
 “ spleen and resentment against a *particular minis-*  
 “ *ter,*” and to prevent the nation in general being  
 reconcil’d to the administration? which is the *thing*,  
 above all others, that this writer dreads. Nor can  
 I blame him for being in a dread and a panick  
 about it; because if this should be the happy effect  
 of this transaction—and it must be *monstrous*, if  
 it should not have that effect, to reconcile every  
 man to the ministry, who is not a determin’d ene-  
 my to his country—this writer’s credit must be  
 for ever ruin’d with the people.

And can we wonder then, at the same time as  
 we pity and detest the *poor creature*, to see him la-  
 bouring this point, not from *facts* or *reasons*, but  
 from *suppositions* and *furmises*——“ of one cer-  
 “ tain minister being recall’d from this court—of  
 “ the over-cautious temper of another aged minis-  
 “ ter, who does not seem to have a head turn’d for  
 “ warlike enterprizes”——to see him, I say,  
 labouring this point, by such tales and furmises as  
 these, “ that the ministers had no share nor merit  
 “ in this transaction”—which he would persuade  
 his readers is done with no other design, but “ to  
 “ take off false colours, and set things in a true  
 “ light.” p. 5.

A noble, publick-spirited design truly, and wor-  
 thy of the author as if it were not much happier  
 for this nation, that the people should believe “ the  
 “ whole merit of this transaction was owing to the  
 “ ministry”—supposing it were *not* true; and by  
 that means all our differences be calm’d and heal’d;  
 than that the people should be persuaded by this  
 writer to believe, “ that the ministry had no share  
 “ or merit in this transaction,” and by that means  
 our differences be inflam’d afresh and reviv’d.

But this writer would have done well to consider, before he had undertaken to set things in a true light, with regard to the conduct of others—that it was incumbent upon him to clear up his own conduct, and to shew them, that he had not represented every measure that was taken, in false colours, and in a wrong light, when he pretended to foretell—  
 “ That those very measures would be the occasion  
 “ of involving us in a war.”

What *pity* it is—that “ a certain *aged minister*,  
 “ who is of an over-cautious temper, and does not  
 “ seem to have a head turn’d for enterprizes of this  
 “ nature”—that he had not this *brave hero*, this  
*warlike genius* at his elbow, to put him in mind—  
 “ That had the *duke of Berwick* been empower’d,  
 “ in the first campaign, to push all the advantages,  
 “ which he then had on the *Rhine*, before *prince*  
 “ *Eugene* was join’d by the *Prussians*, the *Danes*,  
 “ the *Saxons*, and the *Hanoverians*; had he been  
 “ order’d to take the *elector of Bavaria* by the  
 “ hand, instead of sacrificing his time and his  
 “ life before *Philipsburgh*; he might have over-run  
 “ the whole *empire*, and plac’d that prince upon  
 “ the throne of *Vienna*, before *we*, or the *Dutch*,  
 “ could have possibly come to his assistance.”  
 p. 12, 13.

What a *prodigy* of a man is this! how worthy to be *prime minister* to the *greatest* crown’d head in *Europe*! who can sit at home in his closet, and write *Craftsmen*, and at the same time be able, without *knowing* any thing of the secret springs or transactions of foreign courts, not only to direct what measures ought to be pursu’d in his own country, but to give this sage advice to a certain *aged minister* in a foreign court—“ Sir, you are  
 “ of an over-cautious temper, you are aged, and  
 “ do not seem to have a head turn’d for enter-  
 “ prizes



“ prizes of a warlike nature. Give orders to the  
 “ duke of *Berwick* to push the advantages he has,  
 “ order him to take the *elector* of *Bavaria* by  
 “ the hand, let him over-run the whole *empire*,  
 “ and place that prince upon the throne of *Vien-*  
 “ *na*, before the *English* or *Dutch* can come to the  
 “ assistance of the *emperor*.”

Bless us! what danger and destruction have the  
*emperor*, the *English*, and the *Dutch* escap'd, that  
 this vast genius was not at hand to advise this aged  
 minister? what an *irrefragable* proof is this of his  
 “ rejoicing in the present prospect of peace.”——  
 that he did not communicate this advice to the  
 aged minister by his *trusty friend Bolingbroke*?——  
 that these dangerous instructions lay buried within  
 his own breast, till the *time* and *opportunity* for  
 putting them in execution are pass'd and not to be  
 recover'd; and till the *Empire*, *England*, and *Hol-*  
*land* were deliver'd from the danger, and the brink  
 of ruin, which they were expos'd to?

Oh cruel *Gazetteers*, and all ye *ministerial* *wri-*  
*ters* to charge this man with having so much spleen  
 and resentment against a *particular minister*, as to  
 repine at the interest of his country, or the welfare  
 of mankind, and not to rejoice in the present  
 prospect of peace!

But if I may be allow'd my surmises and sup-  
 positions, as well as this *sage politician* may be  
 indulg'd in his; which, I think, is but reasonable,  
 since he assures us——“ that he does not pretend  
 “ to be in any *secrets*”——and yet is so ridiculous,  
 as to sit in judgment upon the most *secret* trans-  
 actions relating to the peace——Suppose, that this  
 aged minister did indeed form this scheme in his  
 own breast, “ That the duke of *Berwick* should  
 “ take the *elector* of *Bavaria* by the hand, that he  
 “ should over-run the whole *empire*, and place

“ that prince upon the throne of *Vienna*, before  
 “ we, or the *Dutch*, could come to the emperor’s  
 “ assistance—Suppose, that it was resolv’d to  
 “ execute this revenge against the emperor for his  
 “ opposing *Stanislaus* his succeeding to the crown  
 “ of *Poland*—Suppose, that this aged minister  
 “ found the elector of *Bavaria* of an over-cautious  
 “ temper, that he dreaded the same fate, as his fa-  
 “ ther met with, had he pursu’d the same measures,  
 “ as he did—Suppose, that the rest of the prin-  
 “ ces of the empire were not so easily to be brought  
 “ in to lend their assistance, or to acquiesce, in  
 “ the elector of *Bavaria*’s being plac’d on the  
 “ throne of *Vienna*, as this aged minister might at  
 “ first hope and believe—Suppose, that this made  
 “ that aged minister to fear and apprehend, that  
 “ if the duke of *Berwick* took the elector of *Ba-*  
 “ *varia* by the hand, this would not only have  
 “ united all the other princes of the empire to op-  
 “ pose this scheme of the aged minister, but have  
 “ brought *England* and *Holland* to the assistance  
 “ of the emperor.

And let me suppose at the same time—that  
 his Majesty’s councils, and the vigorous resolutions  
 of a *British Parliament*, had no little weight and  
 influence to prevail with the elector of *Bavaria*  
 not to join his arms with those of *France*—and  
 then what becomes of this gentleman’s bold and ig-  
 norant assertion—“ That the ministry had no share  
 “ or merit in this transaction.”

But allowing it to be true, what this writer al-  
 ledges, and which is not *improbable* to be the truth  
 in some degree—“ That the peace is owing  
 “ to the over-cautious temper of an aged minister,  
 “ who does not seem to have a head turn’d for  
 “ warlike enterprizes”——can any thing carry  
 a stronger presumption, or a greater probability,  
 if

if not a *certainly*, of truth, than this does——  
That the *vigorous measures*, which were taken by  
the legislature in this kingdom, had a very strong  
and powerful *influence* upon this over-cautious *aged*  
*minister* to desire and resolve on a peace with the  
*emperor*, “rather than run any farther hazard”  
——as this writer expresses it?

And then, whether we suppose—that this *aged*  
*minister* enter’d upon a treaty of peace with the *em-*  
*peror*, without *first* communicating it to the *Eng-*  
*lish* ministry——or, that the ministry were ac-  
quainted with the *first* steps, that were made to-  
wards a peace——which, I am sure, this writer be-  
trays his absolute *ignorance* of. Let *either* suppo-  
sition, I say, be true, it is demonstration——“that  
“the whole merit of this transaction is due to the  
“*English* ministry.”

It was their *vigorous measures*, that made this  
“over-cautious *aged minister*, who has not a head  
“turn’d for warlike enterprizes, rather than run any  
“farther hazard, choose to accept a ridiculous sort of  
“expedient to save the honour of *France* and king  
“*Stanislaus*.” p. 13.

So unfortunate is this *acute* writer in his way  
of reasoning—that that very argument, upon which  
he lays the *greatest* stress, to shew——“that the  
“ministry had no share or merit in this transacti-  
“on”——drawn from the “over-cautious tem-  
“per of an *aged minister*, and his not having a  
“head turn’d for enterprizes of this nature, and  
“not being willing to run any farther hazard”——  
is a strong argument, “That the *English* minis-  
“try, by the *vigorous measures* they pursu’d, and  
“these working upon the over-cautious temper of  
“this *aged minister*, may justly claim the whole  
“merit of this transaction.”



It is, I think, plain from this short view of what this writer has advanc'd—that, let him put what false and artful colours he will upon his design of publishing his *Observations on the present Plan of Peace*, his true design was to inflame and revive our differences; from a consciousness, that the present prospect of peace might heal and totally extinguish all difference among those, who have the interest of their country truly at heart, and rejoice to see it flourish,—let *who will be the ministers.*

Nor can this writer, and his *faction*, make a more awkward figure, nor more grossly give the lye to their whole past conduct, than to pretend——  
 “to rejoice in the present prospect of peace. No  
 “man can sincerely do this, who does not rejoice in  
 “the prospect of the *continuance* of the present  
 “ministry.”

Another design, which this writer had in publishing his *Observations on the present Plan of Peace*, besides this of inflaming our differences at home, was—to render us odious to the several courts and princes abroad.

These are the *two* points, which have been jointly carried on by the *faction*, ever since the day of the commencement of their association. And accordingly we find this writer engag'd in this good work in the *libel* now before us.

“I am very loth (says he) to say *any* thing,  
 “that may seem to carry the least appearance of  
 “depreciating our credit and influence in foreign  
 “courts.” p. 13.

When he has said *every* thing, that *malice*, or *envy*, or *revenge* could suggest to him to ridicule and revile the ministry——then he is “very loth  
 “to say *any* thing, that may seem to carry the least  
 “appearance

“ appearance of depreciating our credit and influence in foreign courts.”

To the same purpose, we have this other declaration of his—“ I am afraid, indeed, that the *emperor* does not think himself much oblig’d to us; for, when the storm broke out upon him, as he foretold, we left him to shift for himself, as well as he could, and sent him no succour or assistance whatsoever, notwithstanding his frequent remonstrances to us, in the most pressing terms; unless giving him the liberty to borrow a little money here, upon his own credit, with our *exhortatory negotiations* abroad, and keeping up a *standing army* at home, are to be look’d upon in that light.” p. 12.

Let me now ask any man, who has the least regard for the peace and welfare of his country—whether it be possible for the most *inveterate* malice to represent us in more *odious* colours to the *emperor*, than this writer has done in these few words? or, what can possibly be said more *provoking* to excite the *emperor* to exercise his revenge against us?

And yet this is the man—*Behold him well!* “ who scorns to have so much spleen or resentment against any *particular minister*, as to repine at the interest of his country, upon his account. Who is virulently and falsely reproach’d with *unworthy* motives to his opposition. Who *rejoices* in the present prospect of peace! Who is willing to believe, there are no *secret articles* behind, in the peace concluded between the *emperor* and *France*”—When his only *fear* is, that the *emperor* will not exercise some act of revenge against us, tho’ we have done *nothing* to provoke him—and when his only *hopes* are, that there are some *secret articles* behind,

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Let me now ask any man, who has the least regard for the peace and welfare of his country—whether it be possible for the most *inveterate* malice to represent us in more *odious* colours to the *emperor*, than this writer has done in these *few* words? or, what can possibly be said more *provoking* to excite the *emperor* to exercise his revenge against us?

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behind, in favour of the *Pretender*, tho' he has little reason to expect any such.

What has all this ribaldry ——— “ of the emperor not thinking himself much oblig'd to us, and our giving him leave to borrow a little money here upon his own credit ” — to do with *Observations on the present Plan of Peace*? How did his argument lead him to throw out this provocation to the emperor to be our enemy? Or is this the best way of shewing ——— “ how very loth he is to say any thing, that may seem to carry the least appearance of depreciating our credit and influence in foreign courts? ”

In one part of this *libel*, he rails at the ministry, because they would not run headlong into the war, as in the passage just now quoted with relation to the emperor. In another part of the same *libel*, he forgets himself, and accuses them for their readiness and desire to go into the war; and upbraids them with the consequences, that would have follow'd upon it, as if they had really happen'd; tho' nothing can be more evident ——— that it was for fear of these very consequences, that the ministry shew'd such a backwardness and reluctance to enter into the war.

“ Had our measures (says he) prevail'd, and drawn the *Dutch* into the war, as we have dragged them into several of our treaties, the present happy turn of affairs would have been so far from coming to pass, that in all probability we should now have been in the heat of a bloody and consuming war, the chief burthen of which might have been laid upon our shoulders, unable as we are to support it. ” p. 18.

Does the poor creature think, that no-body was aware of these consequences of our going into the war, but himself? Or is he only retailing all the scraps,

*senaps*, he has pick'd up in those *coffee-houses*, which he frequents?

But this is not the *merriest* part of it. What an admirable *compliment* is here pass'd upon the *emperor*? at p. 12. "He is terribly afraid, that the *emperor* does not think himself much oblig'd to us, for leaving him to shift for himself, and sending him no succour or assistance" — plainly intimating, that the *emperor* may justly take his revenge of us; and this was an unanswerable reason for going into the war.

At p. 18. "If we had gone into the war, the *chief burthen* of it might have been laid upon our shoulders, unable as we are to support it" — plainly suggesting, that this was an unanswerable reason against our going into the war.

But let me ask him — By whom would "the *chief burthen* of the war have been laid upon our shoulders?" Will he deny, that he does not mean, by the *emperor*? And is not this an excellent *compliment*, or to speak without a figure, the *grossest affront*, that could be offer'd to the *emperor*, whose cause but six pages before he pretends to be pleading?

The ministry are blam'd for not going into the war to assist the *emperor*; and almost in the same breath, they are told, if they had gone into the war, "the *emperor* would have laid the *chief burthen* of it upon our shoulders, unable as we are to support it."

Was ever any writer, besides himself, guilty of such notorious and shameful *inconsistency*? But this gives him no concern, if he can but gain his ends. If he can, as he vainly imagines, make you hated and despised by all the courts in *Europe*. If he can make the *emperor* your enemy, by upbraiding you for not assisting him — If he can but make



the Dutch cool, and indifferent, to assist you, or to come into measures with you for the common safety, by reproaching them for being such dupes, as to be dragg'd by you into several treaties now, and if he can but expose your weakness to all the world, that you may be insulted by all, by publishing, how unable you are to enter into any war.

In sober sadness! what would this *foreign* reasoner, this friend to mankind and to his country, have advis'd the ministry to have done? The emperor does not think himself much oblig'd to us, that is, may justly take his revenge of us, when an opportunity offers. That, notwithstanding his frequent remonstrances to us, in the most pressing terms, we sent him no succour or assistance.

On the other hand—Had we gone into the war, the present happy turn of affairs would have been so far from coming to pass, that in all probability we should now have been in the heat of a bloody and consuming war, and the chief burden of it have been laid upon our shoulders.

Not can this writer possibly bring himself off, or get clear of these self-contradictions, by alleging—that to such a Dilemma were we brought, that we could neither keep out of the broil with honour, nor come into it consistently with our interest, or any considerable ease to the people.

For if it were true, which he can never prove, nor has not so much as attempted—That we could not keep out of the broil with honour—yet, if it be true, what he here alleges, that had we enter'd into this war, the present happy turn of affairs would have been so far from coming to pass, that in all probability we should now have been in the heat of a bloody and consuming

“ burning war, and that the *chief burthen* of it  
 “ would have been laid upon our shoulders.”

If this be true, as there is too much reason to fear  
 this would have been our condition, I appeal to  
 every impartial man, whether this would not have  
 justified us, against any reasons whatsoever, in re-  
 fusing to enter into the war? Especially, if we  
 take in all the other circumstances of this war,  
 and that we were not bound by any treaty to enter  
 into it.

This writer is as little pleas'd with the conduct  
 of the ministry in the *neutrality* they have ob-  
 serv'd; as with their conduct in not entering into  
 the war, tho' in *contradiction* likewise to the princi-  
 ples he himself lays down.

Thus if you tell him — “ That we have avoided  
 “ all the calamities of a war, and reap'd all the  
 “ advantages of peace, by the *neutrality* which we  
 “ have observ'd between the contending powers —  
 “ A *neutrality*, Sir? (says he) Have you not been at  
 “ a vast expence in keeping a large standing army  
 “ at home, in sending a large fleet to sea, in pay-  
 “ ing subsidies to foreign princes, and extraordina-  
 “ ry negotiations in all the courts in *Europe* ?

If we had not put ourselves in these circumstances  
 and situation, then the clamour of this writer, and  
 the *fashion* had been — “ What! Sit still, make no  
 “ preparations, either for our own defence, or to  
 “ assist the weaker side; suffer *France* to over-run  
 “ the *Empire*; give *Spain* an opportunity to make  
 “ conquest of *Portugal* ? If these princes are swal-  
 “ lowed up by the *united powers*, will not *Eng-*  
 “ *land* and *Holland* be the next morsel? Is it not  
 “ prudent and necessary to strike a terror into your  
 “ enemies, by making the necessary preparations  
 “ for war, tho' you resolved not to enter head-  
 “ long into it, or till proper measures were con-

certed, alliances form'd, and all other means  
had been apply'd to put an end to the war.

Nothing can be more evident, from the whole  
conduct and writings of this gentleman, than this  
— That he would have been exceedingly well  
pleas'd, had we either neglected every augmentation  
of our forces at home, and all negotiations abroad;  
or have push'd headlong into the war. Then he  
would have triumph'd indeed, and not without  
cause; for had we done the one, the empire in all  
human probability had been over-run before this  
time; or had we taken the other course, “ instead  
of the present happy turn of affairs (as he him-  
self can acknowledge to serve another purpose)  
in all probability we should now have been in the  
heat of a bloody and consuming war, and the  
chief burden of it laid upon our shoulders.”  
And as much, as he would seem to ridicule all  
negotiations in foreign courts, and all augmentati-  
on of our forces at home, with the help of those  
idle *casu* expressions of — “ *exhortatory negotiations*  
abroad, or of strolling about from court to  
court, like *Knights-errant*, in search of adven-  
tures, and of keeping up large *standing armies*  
in time of peace” — he knows very well, tho'  
he carefully conceals every thing of this sort from  
people in the country, for whose sake he pretends  
to publish these observations, “ in order to dis-  
abuse them, and to prevent their being impos'd  
upon — I say, he knows very well, that  
when he exercis'd this low ridicule upon *exhortatory*  
*negotiations*, and *standing armies*, in another place,  
he was answer'd by some sober man of his own  
party, indeed he is of any party — “ That *negotia-  
tions* with foreign princes were not to be de-  
spis'd or neglected, at such a conjuncture; and,  
that they would have very little effect, unless  
“ back'd



“back’d by a powerful assistance in case of necessity.”

It would be a pity indeed, not to indulge him, in making himself merry or ridiculous, in the exercise of his only, and favourite, talent of buffoonery upon *Knights-errant*; tho’ he himself is the only *Knigh-errant* to take such whimsies into his head—that because, forsooth, we are not upon the continent, but an *Island*, therefore we may bally and bid defiance to all other nations, and despise all *guaranties* or *alliances*.

But farther, had we neglected all negotiations with foreign courts, and all augmentation of our forces at home; then no doubt this writer would have put the ministry in mind of his aged minister

—“What! did you not know, you had to deal  
“with an aged minister, of an over-cautious temper, who had not a head turn’d for enterprizes  
“of a warlike nature, and rather than run any  
“farther hazard of your entering into the war,  
“when he saw the preparations you made for it,  
“would have chose to accept any ridiculous sort  
“of expedient to save the honour of his master?  
“could you possibly be so stupid, as not to see  
“this, that it had been easy to have frightened  
“him into a peace, tho’ you could not negotiate  
“him into one? and would you not put the nation to this expence, to save an infinitely greater, probably, to save your country from utter  
“ruin?”

This must have been the reasoning of this writer, had this been the case. And with much more sense, and reason, and truth, than he argues at present.

Now suppose—that others were as quick-sighted as himself to see and observe the “over-cautious temper of this aged minister, that he had  
“not

"not a head turn'd for emperprizes of a military  
 "nature, and that rather than run any farther  
 "hazard, if he saw *England* arm herself, and  
 "the people in general enter into the war,  
 "he would choose to accept of some expedient to  
 "save the honour of *France* and of king *Stanis-*  
 "*laus*. Was it not a *wise* measure to keep up  
 "a *standing army* at home, and send a powerful *fleet*  
 "abroad? was it not wise to make a trial, what  
 "this expedient and these preparations for our entering  
 "into the war would do? what influence this might  
 "have upon such a minister, as this writer probably  
 "gives us a very just description of, especially when  
 "back'd with strong intimations to this minister—  
 "That we should not sit still and suffer the war  
 "to be carried on any farther.

Was it not prudent to do *all* this, when it seem'd  
 "to be almost the *only* expedient to save the whole?  
 "or will one man, except this writer and his *faction*,  
 "not say, that the ministers deserv'd the worst of  
 "treatment, had they not taken these measures? or is  
 "there a man that can doubt, that the *faction* them-  
 "selves would not have said the same thing, had  
 "the ministry been guilty of so shameful a neglect?

It must be confess'd—that this gentleman has  
 "sometimes his *lucid intervals*, when a *parliamentary* mi-  
 "nister is not uppermost in his thoughts; and that he  
 "can then reason and argue like *other* men. But it  
 "is strange, that he cannot discern at the same time,  
 "that whenever he does reason and argue in this  
 "manner, he never fails to *justify* the very measures,  
 "which he would seem in other parts of his book to  
 "condemn.

Thus, for instance, we find him reasoning in the  
 "discourse now before us.

"The princes of *Europe* (says he) are now  
 "grown wise enough not to suffer any one power  
 "to

" to over-run all the rest, and will take care to  
 " check it, of themselves, when it begins to grow  
 " exorbitant, without our intermeddling any farther  
 " than as common partakers in the danger. It is  
 " always our interest not to engage ourselves too  
 " far, by treaties of alliance and guaranties, but  
 " to keep our hands at liberty, and let contending  
 " princes dispute their quarrels among themselves,  
 " till we see on which side the ballance turns.  
 " In this case, we may always come in with fresh  
 " vigour, and be able to support the weaker party,  
 " as well as our own interest and credit in the  
 " courts of Europe."

To apply this to the present case. If the emper-  
 " or would concern himself in excluding Stanislas  
 " from the throne of Poland: If France resolv'd to  
 " fall upon the emperor, and to take her revenge  
 " purely upon this account: The common danger, in  
 " which we might in the end be involv'd, might  
 " very justly be urg'd as an argument for our as-  
 " sisting the emperor, and not suffering France to  
 " push her conquests too far. But it is the height of  
 " absurdity to say — that we were oblig'd to lend  
 " this assistance, by virtue of any treaties subsisting  
 " between us and the emperor, because the war was  
 " not enter'd into by France in violation and contempt  
 " of any of those treaties.

In this light, every word of what this writer  
 " says here — " of our not intermeddling any far-  
 " ther, than as common partakers in the danger  
 " — of keeping our hands at liberty, and letting  
 " contending princes dispute their quarrels among  
 " themselves, till we see on which side the bal-  
 " lance turns" — is strictly applicable to, and a  
 " full justification of our late conduct.

Thus demonstrable is it, that the ministry have  
 " acted according to the observations, and councils,  
 " and



and *maxims* laid down by this writer — “ by try-  
 “ ing how far vigorous measures, back’d with  
 “ strong resolutions, that we would not be idle  
 “ spectators of the war any longer, would work  
 “ upon an *evil* *corrupt* minister to hearken  
 “ to proposals of peace, by leaving contending  
 “ parties to dispute their quarrels among them-  
 “ selves, till the power of one began to grow too  
 “ oppressive, and common danger call’d upon us to  
 “ support the weaker party” — tho’ he has not  
 the integrity to acknowledge this, or that pre-  
 judice, and party, and passion blind his eyes, and  
 will not let him see it.

I have now gone through what I propos’d to  
 myself, to enquire — what reason the people in  
 the country have to believe and be satisfied, that  
 the *measures* advis’d and pursu’d by  
 the country, were the *real* and *immediate* cause of  
 inducing *France* to hearken to proposals of peace  
 — And, that nothing, but  *spleen* and *reproach*  
 against a particular minister could prevail with this  
 writer to publish his *Observations on the present*  
*Plan of Peace* — And, that for him to pretend to  
*reason* in the present prospect of peace, is most *as-  
 suring*, *false*, and *absurd*.

But I must not take my leave of this *deceitful* per-  
 formance, without making an observation or two  
 — how *lucky*, us, to speak plainly, how *treacherous*  
 a friend he is to the *protestant succession* — And,  
 what hopes he has still left to revive and perpetuate  
 differences and animosities among us.

The application, which this writer makes of  
 treaties of *alliance* and *guaranty*, to *guaranties*  
 of the *protestant succession*, shews very great weak-  
 ness, or very great *treachery* in him, to preserve  
 this *succession*.

“ We

“ We want (says he) no *guarranties* of the *pro-*  
 “ *testant succession*, which is so firmly establish’d al-  
 “ ready, that nothing but *very bad* measures can  
 “ ever shake it, and it is in his Majesty’s power  
 “ effectually to secure it, against all opposition, in  
 “ the *hearts* of his subjects, by such plain and easy  
 “ methods, as are always attended, in this king-  
 “ dom, with universal popularity and affection —  
 “ I mean, the *reformation* of our *abuses*, and a  
 “ *redress* of our *grievances*: *good laws* for the secu-  
 “ rity of *liberty*, the *succour* of our *colonies*, and  
 “ the *encouragement* of *trade*, which have been  
 “ so long desir’d, and are now grown absolutely  
 “ necessary.” p. 34.

I readily agree — “ That *very bad* measures  
 “ will always shake the establishment of the *protes-*  
 “ *tant succession*.” But it is by no means true —  
 “ that *nothing* but *very bad* measures can ever  
 “ shake it.

I believe this gentleman will not deny — that  
 every *rebellion* against the present government tends  
 to weaken and shake it. And if nothing but *very bad*  
 measures can occasion a *rebellion*, will he be pleas’d  
 to tell us — *what* bad measures were taken to  
 give occasion to the *rebellion* in the late king’s  
 reign.

But notwithstanding all the idle *grimaces* of this  
 writer, that we want no *guarranties* of the *protes-*  
 “ *tant succession* — every true friend to that succession  
 must think it the highest wisdom and prudence to  
 desire such *alliances* and *guarranties* with all *protes-*  
 “ *tant princes*, because it is *their* interest to support  
 and protect the *protestant succession* in this king-  
 dom. Nor are such *alliances* and *guarranties*, up-  
 on several occasions according to the *circumstances*  
 of affairs, to be disregarded, but even to be culti-  
 vated with *popish* princes.

One would imagine, that the *rights* of the thing speaks this plainly enough, had we never had the experience of it. But I know not how it comes to pass, that there is always a sort of *fatality* attends this gentleman in all his writings — That he is ever to *contradict* and *confute* himself.

We have a most *sagacious* instance of this in the case before us. For p. 15, 16. he tells us — That if Philip had been actually turn'd out of Spain, according to the original design of the *grand alliance*, he would have been the first prince of the blood in France, and consequently had a right to the regency of that kingdom at the very time, when a *rebellion* was set on foot here to defeat the *protestant succession*. In this case, he would have certainly been full of the highest resentment against us, for depriving him of the Spanish dominions, back'd with the whole strength and treasures of France, by which he might have given the rebels such powerful assistance, that I tremble to think what might have been the consequence — But, by leaving Philip in possession of Spain, another prince became *regent* of France, at that time, whose interest it was to support our *succession*; perhaps, by private intelligence; at least, by not sending a man to the Pretender's assistance.

Does this prove — That the *protestant succession* is so firmly established already, that nothing but *very bad measures* can shake it; and that we can never want the *guardians* even of *popish* princes? Or is it not a direct and the strongest proof of the contrary?

For pray observe. At p. 16. "The good man trembles to think what might have been the consequences, if Philip had been *regent* of France, at the time a *rebellion* was set on foot here to defeat



"*fear the protestant succession.*" But at p. 34. all this is forgot; and, "we want no *guaranties* of the protestant succession." Did ever any writ so shamefully contradict himself?

If the duke of Orleans, who was regent of France at the time of that rebellion here, had not been a friend to our succession, which is the same thing as if he had guaranteed our succession; and whose friendship to us could proceed from no other cause than this — That we had, privately at least, engag'd ourselves to support his succession to the crown of France, in case the present king of France had died without issue-male. If this had been the case, that the duke of Orleans had been our enemy; this writer himself confesses — "That he trembles to think, what would have been the consequences of the rebellion then set on foot to defeat the protestant succession."

But now the gentleman is happily eased and delivered of all such trembling fits for the safety and security of the protestant succession — Now, "We want no guaranties of this succession. And if a rebellion were set on foot, to defeat the protestant succession, and France were full of the highest resentment against us, we had nothing to fear."

Is not this most excellent reasoning? I will do our author the justice to acknowledge — "That I verily believe, he as truly rejoices in the present prospect of peace, as he wishes the safety and security of the protestant succession."

Let every impartial man now judge — whether the instances given by this writer of the protestant succession being absolutely secur'd and saved by the guaranty, or, which is the same thing, by the friendship of France, at the time of the rebellion, be not an uncontestable proof — that it is the interest of this nation to cultivate the friendship, and guar-

of the *protestant succession*, as well of *popish*, as *protestant* princes.

For the *popish* princes might not comply with all the terms of such an *alliance* or *guaranty*, so far as to send forces to your assistance, upon any invasion or rebellion; yet, "by private intelligence, at least by not sending a man to the *Pretender's* assistance," a dangerous invasion or rebellion might (as in the case before us) be prevented or defeated.

And as very bad measures will always shake the *protestant succession* in these kingdoms; so the hearts of his majesty's subjects is the best method to secure it. But this is no argument against securing it by those other methods of cultivating a friendship and alliance with other princes and powers; especially when there is a *pretender* to the crown, who derives his birth from those princes, who so very lately sat on the *British* throne.

But this writer is of another opinion, and thinks all securities of this kind are to be neglected and despised; and that the best and the only methods to protect the *protestant succession* are — "reformation of abuses, redress of grievances, and good laws for the security of liberty, the succour of our colonies, and the encouragement of trade; which have been so long desired, and are now grown absolutely necessary."

Reformation of abuses, redress of grievances, and good laws for the security of liberty, are very general and ambiguous words; and, till this writer explains himself, it is impossible to say, how far these are wanting or necessary.

But, if we may guess at his meaning, by the late attempts to reform abuses, redress grievances, and to enact laws for the security of liberty — they would

would be so far from having the *least* tendency to establish the *protestant succession*, or to secure and preserve the present *government* and *constitution*; that they are evidently *calculated* for no other purpose, but to subvert the *constitution*, and to change this *monarchy* into a *meer commonwealth*.

So far is this writer from having any view, by enquiries of this nature, to strengthen and secure the *protestant succession*, that he only makes use of this as a *cloak* to conceal his real design, which is — to inflame our differences, and infuse jealousy into the minds of the people, under the *specious* pretences of reforming *abuses*, redressing of *grievances*, and enacting laws for the security of *liberty*; this being the last resort of the *faction*, in the present happy situation of affairs abroad.

Our author concludes his *observations* with declaring — “ That he has gone through this enquiry, without the least design of reflecting upon  
“ *any particular person*.”

But can he flatter himself, that he deserves the least credit in this? and has he so soon forgot what he has asserted in the 17th page of this Enquiry —  
“ That if it should happen, that *any minister* hath,  
“ either ignorantly or presumptuously, expos’d his  
“ country to extreme hazards; would not the  
“ people be justly esteem’d madmen, should they  
“ trust HIM again as their guide, or suffer him  
“ to draw them into the same perils.”

Is there no design here of reflecting on any *particular person*? is not *one person* alone mark’d out to the people? are they not warn’d and admonish’d, “ how ignorantly, how presumptuously  
“ *this person* has expos’d his country, and that they  
“ may be justly esteem’d madmen, should they trust  
“ *him* again, as their guide?”

If



If no reflection was design'd on one particular person, why was one particular person in the administration distinguish'd, in this remarkable manner, from all others?

Is this to shew no spleen, no resentment against any particular minister? On the contrary, are not here all the marks of revenge and disappointment—of envying a particular minister the glory of what he has done for his country—of repining to behold his credit, and reputation, and abilities, for ever establish'd with prince and people——if the people be not abus'd, as he ridiculously expresses it?

Or, *Si Populus vult decipi*, and they will think the peace to be a good one, and that the ministry had some share and merit in the transacting of it—then he retreats to his last shift—"the reformation of abuses, the redress of grievances, and the en-acting good laws for the security of liberty."

*Risum teneatis?*

Is any man so blind, as not to see, that this is the only scheme the faction have to build upon? All complaints, and harangues, about foreign affairs, must cease and have an end; and the people must be amus'd, their expectations rais'd, and animosities kept alive, by those well-sounding words, "of reforming abuses, of redressing of grievances, and good laws for the security of liberty."

This being the only sanctuary of the faction, and this our present situation——I cannot shut up this discourse better than in the words of an ingenious writer—"To conclude, my countrymen, I conjure you to reflect on the present happy state you are now in, and the danger you may incur

" incur by those, who would put you on bring-  
 " ing about *reformations* and *revolutions*. Weigh  
 " well their *arguments*, and examine nicely their  
 " *harangues*, remembering always this short cau-  
 " tion—that **MEN** follow **REASON**, and  
 " **BEASTS** are led by **SOUNDS**."

## F I N I S.

